"Permissable pluralism." Nietzsche and James offer Geoff's 'permissable pluralism.' Good conversation. Nice work.

It was a good show and I am looking forward to a discussion on evolutionary ethics.
Kudos to Geoffrey for hinting at the idea of a pursuit of happiness not being this wholly grail of human psychology, ethics and political theory.
It would be interesting if Will invites someone who would probe at the role concept of happiness plays in Wilkinson's own thinking.

Go Heels. That is all.

Hmmm. The verbal fall-out from imputing reality on emptiness is endless. But probably not much choice where we muddle along in the theatre of conventions. Stimulating discussion. Thanks to both. More of this same tenor would be good as a goad to take more inclusive and hence more meaningful macro views of the micro-trivia so often psychically enslaving BHTV "Comments" discussions. EW

Too short! Too short! Who sanctified the hour? Why? Why not two? Why not split it into parts? Why not five?

Quoting Eastwest: Hmmm.
More of this same tenor would be good as a goad to take more inclusive and hence more meaningful macro views of the micro-trivia so often psychically enslaving BHTV "Comments" discussions.
EW

So are you suggesting that you might be open to expanding the parameters of your usual narrow and self-referential interpretation by fiat? As in positing instead of proclaiming, addressing questions instead of deflecting by insisting that only you are the keeper of the flame, whereas we are mere dupes of failed intellect and under the spell of snake oil and false charms?

Quoting graz: So are you suggesting that you might be open to ....

Seems like an unnecessarily contentious response to my comment. Frankly, most of what is frothed over with such fervor in electoral-politics discussions here is a matter of opinion about which ultimate-truth claims are frivolous and absurd. (And, I dare say, a bit boring to boot.) I'm merely suggesting more of a "big-picture" view could conduce to less ego-invested reaction when someone dares to chide you for a cherished view clung to like some religious tenet of huge moral significance. In short: I guess I find gratuitous gutter-language over mere opinions tedious in the extreme. Too much civility is probably not necessary, either, but pretending a disagreeable idea is something to die for is just ridiculous. For a moderately humorous illustration of the analysis-versus-reality dissonance of which I speak skip ahead in this five minute real-audio clip (writer's almanac) to the two minutes from 2:20 to 4:25 (just double-clicking the link should bring up your Real Player): http://www.publicradio.org/tools/med.../2008/04/24_wa Cheers,
EW

You are right about the tone in regard to this particular comment... that would be my point. Anybody who monitors this board probably views responses on a continuum. We all have our preferences, but fail to vest much concern in others approach.
I also agree with your psych profile of the advantage of a big picture approach.
It's all about balance... and there is plenty of falling down around these electoral-politics hot tub sessions. Cheers to you too.
Thanks for the link.

Wow! Geoffrey Sayre-McCord -- what a treat! I recommend his collection of essays on Moral Realism -- I think I've recommended it (or articles in it) before here in the Comments Sewer.
I was a little worried people would find the discussion too abstruse. I'm really relieved to find that reactions have so far been very positive. In the final section of the discussion (about whether moral judgments might be just preferences disguised and the worry about what you do when you face someone who just doesn't care about moral goods), I wish Sayre-McCord had pointed out how difficult it really is for people consistently not to care about rights and fairness etc. It's certainly very easy not to care about other people when we have the upper hand, to just pursue our own interests, treating other people as mere means to our ends. But let someone treat US in that way, and we will quickly discover that we ourselves believe that others treatment of us must be justified in some way TO us. We believe WE are not mere means to others' ends. And when we try to spell out why we are

[quote=Bloggin' Noggin;
I was a little worried people would find the discussion too abstruse. [/QUOTE] Well it was abstruse, and I had to look-up that word in the dictionary also.
The first time through, I was distracted by a competing conversation. I'm really glad I gave it my full attention afterwards. Good stuff indeed.

If they're getting philosophers of the caliber of Sayre-McCord or Knobe, they really ought to get Mike Rea, Dean Zimmerman, Hans Halvorsen, Bas van Fraassen, Al Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, Fritz Warfield, Robert Audi, Eleonore Stump, Marilyn Adams, or Robert Adams to argue the theistic side against Horgan or Johnson.

How large does a community have to be before it qualifies as having its own morality? Is there any firm place we can point to in between one universal morality for everyone and everyone having their own private morality? How cohesive does a group have to be about its moral sentiments?

I liked Geoffrey's neologism unobtainium. Definitely stealing that. I liked this conversation more as it progressed. The first part was well-characterized by themightypuck. Listening to a half hour of attempts to define terms when you know the conclusion is going to be "we can't really define these terms" gets a little tedious. I know I'm being a bit of a philistine here, but I think it's always important to keep the audience in mind. The second half of the conversation was better, and I wished they could have gotten into some of the evolutionary aspects, too.

Another in an awesome string of fascinating programs by Will!! I'm enjoying the Science Saturday and Free Will weekend on climate change and moral philosophy. A wonderful break from the electoral food fight.

So, did anyone become a moral realist in the course of this? Are there any moral facts? Do we need to invoke moral properties in explaining non-moral facts? Can we explain the holocaust without mentioning Hitler's evil? Could the justice of a society explain its stability (or could injustice explain instability)?

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: So, did anyone become a moral realist in the course of this?

Are there any moral facts?

Do we need to invoke moral properties in explaining non-moral facts? Can we explain the holocaust without mentioning Hitler's evil? Could the justice of a society explain its stability (or could injustice explain instability)?

I will only go so far as to say that I can believe in the existence of moral truths. I'd find it hard to name any specific ones, though. I don't think we need to have a complete and consistent philosophy that is time- and culture-independent to hold a justifiable view of Hitler. He was contrary to what we consider "good," by the standards of our civilization. I am content to use the word "evil" as convenient shorthand for him, and to label his actions and commands in this way for lack of a better term. "Psychopathic" might work equally well, especially in its colloquial sense.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Can we explain the holocaust without mentioning Hitler's evil?

In evil as with virtue, there are no inherently-existing qualities, just as there are no inherently-existing entities in which they might reside. Assuming it's Spring somewhere by now (not here, yet), here's a poem: Song of the Spring Breeze The breeze of Spring—What feelings does it have
When, at dawn and at dusk, it visits groves and gardens?
Not asking who owns the peach trees or plums,
It just wafts down pink blossoms and utters no words. By the T’ang Dynasty Monk, Ch’i-chi (864-937 ce)
EW

Quoting Eastwest: For a moderately humorous illustration of the analysis-versus-reality dissonance of which I speak skip ahead in this five minute real-audio clip (writer's almanac) to the two minutes from 2:20 to 4:25 (just double-clicking the link should bring up your Real Player):

http://www.publicradio.org/tools/med.../2008/04/24_wa

Writer's Almanac: Best show on radio. And that's a great, entertaining poem. Thanks.

Quoting graz: Well it was abstruse, and I had to look-up that word in the dictionary also.
The first time through, I was distracted by a competing conversation. I'm really glad I gave it my full attention afterwards. Good stuff indeed.

Will really does an amazing job with this series.

Can we explain the holocaust without mentioning Hitler's evil?

Certainly Hitler explained his conduct in moral terms. He subscribed basically (with a little pop Nietzsche thrown in) to the core moral tenets of Western civilization. Our political systems are based on nationalism; Hitler was "merely" an ultra-nationalist. Even his eugenics and anti-Semitism were allegedly for "the greater good" of the German people (Aryans). All the leaders of WWII engaged in acts of evil by the standard of "depraved indifference" and deliberate infliction of death by firebombing and starvation. That goes for Churchill, Roosevelt, the Japanese, the Italians, the Russians and so on. Churchill was an incorrigible racist and imperialist; Roosevelt was an anti-Semite. Truman thought it was okay to drop atom bombs on civilians. Most of the action, as in all wars, was around everyone claiming to be the aggrieved party who was acting in self-defense, to rectify or avenge a wrong. Much as I despise Nazism, I don't think it makes a good test case for grappling with "evil." Hitler really believed Jews were "poisoning" humanity and causing all the world's ills. Anti-Semitism is a set of mistaken ideas. There's no "evil" there. Just bullshit, flag pins and military parade music. It might be

Quoting kidneystones: ...William Ayers....Krauthammer ... broken moral compass of Barack Obama....Ayers-Obama, Wright-Obama and Rezko-Obama...Flag-pins...Indiana Voters... Wright , Rezko and Ayers...flag-pins as a 'distraction'...

Is this post in the wrong thread?
Which diavlog are you watching?

Quoting Wonderment: Certainly Hitler explained his conduct in moral terms. He subscribed basically (with a little pop Nietzsche thrown in) to the core moral tenets of Western civilization. Our political systems are based on nationalism; Hitler was "merely" an ultra-nationalist. Even his eugenics and anti-Semitism were allegedly for "the greater good" of the German people (Aryans).

Is this limitation to concern only for Germans or Aryans morally justifiable? I would say that it isn't, and that if Hitler's justification stops there, then it isn't really a moral justification. All the leaders of WWII engaged in acts of evil by the standard of "depraved indifference" and deliberate infliction of death by firebombing and starvation. That goes for Churchill, Roosevelt, the Japanese, the Italians, the Russians and so on. Churchill was an incorrigible racist and imperialist; Roosevelt was an anti-Semite. Truman thought it was okay to drop atom bombs on civilians. Whether the allies were any better than Hitler is beside the point -- they could be evil too, without threatening the explanation offered (Hitler's evil was a contributing cause to the events of the Holocaust).
However, I will mention two points: 1) A case can certainly be made that Churchill and Roosevelt were morally better

It seems to me that the first steps in building a system of ethics are where all the important questions lie. Deciding what to value is a much harder, and more interesting, set of questions than how to measure the relative value of something. Without having had a discussion the relationship between evolution and the list of things that we might care about, fundamentally, it seem as if questions about an absolute basis for morality are meaningless. I don’t want to die. I don’t want to feel discomfort. I want these things for those I care about. Are there any questions of ethics that can’t ultimately, by some algebra, be reduced to one or more of these fundamental questions? Maybe social dominance? Even that reduces to the first three questions(*), I think. Does believing the above make me a moral relativist? I probably self-identify that way. Added: I'm taking note that I apparently don't know the difference between a question and an assertion.

Quoting bjkeefe: I will only go so far as to say that I can believe in the existence of moral truths. I'd find it hard to name any specific ones, though.

I find that hard to believe. What about the following?
1. It's morally wrong to torture babies just for the pleasure of it.
2. The mere fact that I'd prefer it if Fred died isn't adequate moral reason for killing him.
3. You and I possess moral standing (i.e., our interests cannot morally be discounted in determining how to treat us).

I don't think we need to have a complete and consistent philosophy that is time- and culture-independent to hold a justifiable view of Hitler. He was contrary to what we consider "good," by the standards of our civilization. I am content to use the word "evil" as convenient shorthand for him, and to label his actions and commands in this way for lack of a better term. "Psychopathic" might work equally well, especially in its colloquial sense.

What are "our standards" in this case? Are they part of the very meaning of the word "evil" and "good"? Or are they completely separable from what we mean by "evil" and "good"?
Suppose you come across

Hi Jeff,
Thanks for the answer. A few comments below:

Quoting AemJeff: It seems to me that the first steps in building a system of ethics are where all the important questions lie. Deciding what to value is a much harder, and more interesting, set of questions than how to measure the relative value of something. Without having had a discussion the relationship between evolution and the list of things that we might care about, fundamentally, it seem as if questions about an absolute basis for morality are meaningless.

I don't think we are in any position to "build a system of ethics" from scratch. Just as we start off with a commonsense view of the world (or more accurately a set of commonsense views about different aspects of the world), we start off with certain values. Reflection and further inquiry can modify that initial commonsense view of the world in ultimately quite radical ways, as we see from the history of science. The same goes for our commonsense evaluative thought. We don't start out outside the evaluative realm and try to construct a set of values. We start out within the

As always, thanks for the thoughtful response. Am I missing something important? I think of formal systems of ethics as codifications of something that already exists - worked out to fix the inconsistencies, to the extent that that can be done - much like the relationship between formal grammar and natural language. If that’s a valid point of view, then I don’t think that we do “build” our systems of ethics from scratch any more than we build our languages from scratch. Of course, we can tinker with them, but my hypothesis is that that they’re effects of how we’re built rather than artifacts. I can easily imagine, at one extreme, a society in which eating your neighbors children, for example, is considered highly moral behavior. Conversely, I can imagine one in which ritual suicide is a preferable alternative to offending a peer. I think the differences in detail owe more to happenstance than to the intrinsic value of “goodness” you might assign to a certain class of acts. To the list of “fundamental” motives I think the thing I’d consider adding is genetic survival, in Dawkins’ sense of “selfish genes,” but that seems one step removed. Even if there’s no “ethical algebra,” as such, I think

Quoting AemJeff: As always, thanks for the thoughtful response.

Am I missing something important? I think of formal systems of ethics as codifications of something that already exists - worked out to fix the inconsistencies, to the extent that that can be done - much like the relationship between formal grammar and natural language. If that’s a valid point of view, then I don’t think that we do “build” our systems of ethics from scratch any more than we build our languages from scratch. Of course, we can tinker with them, but my hypothesis is that that they’re effects of how we’re built rather than artifacts.

I see. It sounded to me as though you wanted the moral realist to undertake a kind of Cartesian project with respect to morality -- throw it all out and then see whether it can be re-assembled on skeptic-resistant foundations.
Apparently, you were actually talking about normative ethical theory (or perhaps merely sociology), rather than about meta-ethics in your first paragraph.
There will certainly be a big difference --a difference relevant to the meta-ethical debate -- between formulating general rules of grammar and formulating a normative ethical theory. The grammarian simply

BN:

I find that hard to believe. What about the following?
1. It's morally wrong to torture babies just for the pleasure of it.
2. The mere fact that I'd prefer it if Fred died isn't adequate moral reason for killing him.
3. You and I possess moral standing (i.e., our interests cannot morally be discounted in determining how to treat us).

Probably I'd accept those. I certainly can't envision a scenario whereby #1 would ever be viewed as acceptable. The latter two, it seems to me, are conceivably arguable as specific to our kind of society. That is, I could imagine a much more harsh or rigid culture where they might not apply, at least not uniformly. Certainly, there are plenty of historical examples of societies where doing away with, or discounting, people who thought, looked, or behaved differently was apparently not a troubling notion for those societies. To your next section discussing "standards:" I don't have much to say in response here. Couple of quick points: I'm not sure I accept the idea that "evil" exists as a universal concept if "evil" means different things to different people/cultures. I suppose the suggestion that no matter the culture, one always observes some tendency to categorize behaviors says something, but

Is this limitation to concern only for Germans or Aryans morally justifiable? I would say that it isn't, and that if Hitler's justification stops there, then it isn't really a moral justification.

No, certainly not. But, as I said, Hitler's "justification" is an extension of tribal identity and nationalism. We live in a world in which nation state self-interest and competition is generally viewed as morally good, or at least acceptable. The boundary between Norwegian or Costa Rican nationalism (relatively benign) and Nazi nationalism (resulting in the murder of millions) is not clear in moral terms. All nation states appear to do things which they know are good for themselves but detrimental to other nation states. (Indeed, this is the basis for the Marxist critique of bourgeois capitalism, which I do not, incidentally support). International law, the UN and similar institutions are attempts to reduce the more pernicious expressions of national self-interest and to find frameworks for cooperation rather than competition. But as it stands now, we can only point to allegations of violations of the norms, eg. Sadam invades Kuwait. But Sadam is not going to be caught without a moral argument for the UN in his invasion of Kuwait. He

Apparently, you were actually talking about normative ethical theory (or perhaps merely sociology), rather than about meta-ethics in your first paragraph.

Ouch! What I was about was trying to understand the nature of the types of systems we're discussing. If "ethics" is ultimately descriptive rather than assertive then an exploration of meta-ethics might be (never let it be said that I drop an analogy easily) fairly characterized as something similar to Chomsky's project. There's a lot in your response that I need to internalize, but this (from one of your responses to Brendan):

I think our conception of moral wrongness is closely connected to what we would regard as (not merely unpleasant but) OBJECTIONABLE or UNJUSTIFIABLE if it were done to us.

doesn't square with my understanding. I could quibble with the adjectives “objectionable” and “unjustifiable” which seem open to interpretation and almost make the argument seem circular; but also I don't understand exactly how this definition relates to ideas of sexual morality. (I'm open to the idea that a discussion of sexual morality is on another topic.)

While listening at 40:00, a confluence of Schellenberger's "Break Through" and a critique of retentive materialism struck me. If one retains the retentive materialist view of chairs, one also keeps a door open to retaining evil as a socially regulative tool. But, to change humanity's relationship to nature, away from a subject distinct from nature, one has to abandon retentive materialism. There is Diamond's claim, that humans are a genocidal species, like lions and chimps, that kill members of their own group for territorial expansion. Diamond holds open the possibility, that accepting this disposition allows for establishing social taboos, drawing upon Darwin's distinction between natural and social selection. But, a retentive moral belief might put a hurdle to abandoning the belief in human exceptionalism, thereby opening a back door to evil as we try to retain the good. Alright, break over!

Quoting bjkeefe: BN:
Probably I'd accept those. I certainly can't envision a scenario whereby #1 would ever be viewed as acceptable.

The latter two, it seems to me, are conceivably arguable as specific to our kind of society. That is, I could imagine a much more harsh or rigid culture where they might not apply, at least not uniformly. Certainly, there are plenty of historical examples of societies where doing away with, or discounting, people who thought, looked, or behaved differently was apparently not a troubling notion for those societies.

Apparently you are saying that a moral judgment is true for a particular society if and only if it is accepted as customary by that society. And you are saying that a moral judgment is true without qualification if and only if every society regards it as customary.
I've already pointed out one problem with this to Jeff -- that there are a lot of customs we don't regard as moral (e.g., you should wear a shirt to work at a bank).
Another problem is that you are here using a sociological sense of "moral" which is clearly not the one people employ when they actually

Quoting AemJeff: Ouch! What I was about was trying to understand the nature of the types of systems we're discussing. If "ethics" is ultimately descriptive rather than assertive then an exploration of meta-ethics might be (never let it be said that I drop an analogy easily) fairly characterized as something similar to Chomsky's project.

Why "ouch"? I was simply attempting to understand what your intended meaning. Sorry if it sounded as though I was being dismissive. I really didn't have such an intention.
I take it that by "assertive" above, you mean "normative"? Anthropologists probably do approach ethics descriptively: i.e., they attempt to describe the various customs of a culture. As I pointed out above, not all customs are regarded as embodying moral requirements -- it's not customary to wear speedos to work at a bank, and few people would do it because it would shame them and would hardly further their careers. But we would not regard someone who did this as immoral, and we would certainly not regard a society in which speedos were appropriate bank attire as immoral. On the other hand, we would regard torturing people for the fun of it as immoral, and would not be persuaded

Hi Wonderment, GSR raises this case as an example of a correct moral explanation. The term "evil" tends to raise a lot of red flags, so I kind of wish he hadn't used it. He could have chosen another explanation. I wonder what you would think if he had said, "the holocaust happened in part because Hitler was a bad man." Of course, "bad man" seems like quite an understatement when it comes to Hitler. Gilbert Harman claims that moral properties don't explain anything -- that we can explain the holocaust without supposing that Hitler was a bad man. But can we? We can imagine that Hitler was really a very decent, kindly person who never would have ordered mass murder -- maybe he was just a figurehead and his underlings ordered the holocaust on his authority. But that explanation is clearly not the true one.
Ultimately, the argument is that Harman begs the question against the moral realist by assuming that it's possible to assume that Hitler was monumentally indifferent to millions of human beings, even cruel, without assuming that he was a bad guy. The moral realist should not admit that this is

The term "evil" tends to raise a lot of red flags, so I kind of wish he hadn't used it. He could have chosen another explanation.

Yes, I found that a distraction as well.

I wonder what you would think if he had said, "the holocaust happened in part because Hitler was a bad man."

Well, I even have some difficulty with that, although I respond emotionally to Hitler by being disgusted, shocked, appalled, horrified, etc. But I'm not sure you need "badness" (just a substitute word for "evil"). I think a scientific explanation of HItler suffices. Once biochemistry, neurology and psychology are done with him, there is nothing left. The testosterone-sertonin-whatever levels plus his particular wiring of the brain plus the conditioning of experience (abuse or neglect, low-IQ reading of Nietzsche, love for Wagner, etc.) suffice to explain him. There is no need to bring in the "ghost in the moral machine": badness.

Ultimately, the argument is that Harman begs the question against the moral realist by assuming that it's possible to assume that Hitler was monumentally indifferent to millions of human beings, even cruel, without assuming that he was a bad guy. The moral realist should not admit that this is possible.

Yes. There is no extra "badness" once you've

Whoops, I wasn't taking offense. “Mere sociology” sounds like something the engineering and hard science types I work with use reflexively as a mostly joking put-down. I was reacting in character, trying to be funny.

If I make a promise to be faithful to someone else, then, assuming there are good impartial reasons for keeping promises, I seem to have that kind of reason to be faithful, and the other person would have reason to object to my breaking the promise.

I would argue that this sort of exchange is better characterized as a contractual transaction rather than specifically about sexual morality. It could just as well be about anything. The reason I brought it sexual morality is that, putting aside the discussion of terms, the loose definition you proposed doesn’t seem to cover, for instance, the “immorality” of having multiple partners. If an examination of ethics is normative, then you and I can’t pick and choose which ethical subcategories we believe are valid. I’m still reading your posts but these few questions seemed worth getting out there.

[quote=AemJeff;75559] The reason I brought it sexual morality is that, putting aside the discussion of terms, the loose definition you proposed doesn’t seem to cover, for instance, the “immorality” of having multiple partners. If an examination of ethics is normative, then you and I can’t pick and choose which ethical subcategories we believe are valid.
[quote] I don't understand -- why should normative ethics have to validate every single claim of commonsense morality?
If a scientist studies perception, there will be problems if he winds up showing that sight, hearing and touch are all completely non-veridical. (In that case, science itself would seem to have no basis in evidence.) But nobody expects a study of perception to validate absolutely every sensory experience, from optical illusions to Uncle Fred's lunch meeting with the Archangel Gabriel at Maxim's.
Why shouldn't we be happy if our normative moral theory validates a core set of our most confident moral views and rejects those that seem a lot more iffy?